Stephen Kinzer lays out all of the situations when the American government has overthrown a foreign government. It is indeed a long list: Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Nicaragua, Honduras, Iran, Chile, South Vietnam, Guatemala, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In most of the situations, our reasons seem incredibly unjust. Unfortunately, the book is far too superficial to feel completely confident in all of its conclusions. Either way though, in the end our actions rarely resulted with us achieving our aims in the long run and in many of the situations we should feel ashamed for what we did.
The idea of the book is brilliant. It means to show how badly America has been at regime change and how many times our reasons for intervening were both bunk and unjust. Unfortunately, the book lacks solid detail and analysis, and gives the feeling that the author wanted to rush through the book so he could fit everything in. Overall it makes a good point, but for the individual cases, I feel that I would need to do more research to draw any real conclusions. (This is of course the exact opposite feeling you get from Samantha Power's book - you don't feel like she left anything out.)
The author notes that he has left Indonesia, Brazil, the Congo, Mexico, Haiti and the Dominican Republic off the list because for the first three the US didn't play the decisive role in the overthrow and in the last three the US invaded but did not overthrow the governments. Kinzer also does a good job of giving us a list of villains, including John Foster Dulles, Henry Kissinger, and everyone in the George W. Bush administration.
Kinzer breaks the book into three sections based on the types of intervention. The first section describes overthrows that were based largely on imperialistic grounds. This isn't how it was justified to the public, but based on the evidence Kinzer gives us, there is little doubt the reasons were to expand our power and protect American business. The following countries fall into this list: Hawaii (now a state), Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Of these countries, Cuba, the Philippines, Nicaragua and Honduras have had a tumultuous history since our intervention and were much more peaceful beforehand.
The second part shows covert action against supposed leaders leaning towards communism. Countries included in this section are Iran, Chile, South Vietnam and Guatemala. In each of these countries though, threat of communism was either misinterpreted or a veil to disguise imperialist reasons.
Presidents and others had no doubt the Soviets were manipulating Mossadegh [Iran], Arbenz [Guatemala], and Allende [Chile]. That turned out to have been wrong. The three leaders had differing views of Marxism - Mossadegh detested it, Arbenz sympathized with it, Allende embraced it - but they were nationalists above all.In Guatemala and Chile, various American business interests (United Fruit, telephone, railroad, and others) would have been hurt by the popular socialist / nationalist governments. And in Iran, Mossadegh, their popular leader, wanted to take back control of the country's oil wealth from foreign companies. Our current poor relations with Iran can be traced back to the moment we overthrew Mossadegh. And our history in Chile, where we overthrew a popularly elected president and supported a violent far-right government, is something we should forever be ashamed of. Vietnam was of course unlike the other three in that we were overthrowing a leader while we were aiding that country in war - we hoped to get a leader who would be better in the war against North Vietnam.
The third section focuses on actual invasions. Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq all fall into this section. We know much about the later two; I think most would say that our invasion of Afghanistan was just, but we turned our attention to Iraq far too soon, and Iraq was neither just nor has it been managed well. The first two also might be argued as somewhat legit (Noriega and the New Jewel leaders were ruining their countries), but again, poorly managed and unstable following our intervention (the looting in Panama is all too similar to Iraq).
What we see throughout the book, and still present today, is American aggression towards countries that attempt to exercise independence and empowerment. On the flip side, America exhibits tolerance for oppression and violence by leaders of countries that support us and give free reign to our businesses. Our role in Iran has had disastrous effects on our foreign policy, we are still paying for preventing elections in Cuba, and we should be seriously ashamed by what we tolerated in Chile and elsewhere in the name of propping up governments that would be anti-communist and pro-American (but not democratic). We should have learned our lesson before Iraq, and we should mind it when we deal with someone like Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan.