The John Yoo Interview

I know I am late to the party on this one, but I finally got around to watching Jon Stewart's interview (January 11, 2010 - in three parts) of John Yoo - infamous author of the "torture memo". I remember hearing that Stewart apparently blew the interview, and he apologized afterwards.

After watching it, I think it was a great and thoughtful interview. Granted, I am sure Stewart and many of his liberal viewers were hoping for John Yoo to get skewered and end up as contrite and apologetic as Jim Cramer. But that is an unrealistic expectation. Instead, what you had was a great debate (although it might have been better with someone with more expertise than Stewart to battle Yoo) on executive power. And it seems to me that the type of debate they had is rare on TV - it was considered, pretty long, and most of all, respectful.

I appreciated hearing John Yoo's point of view that a strong executive is necessary to have a government capable of responding to developing situations. And he conceded that it is necessary even when president's are likely to make mistakes sometimes. Juxtaposing Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation with Bush's GWOT is instructive (actually Yoo compared it to Nixon and Watergate, which was a bad comparison since Nixon's actions were clearly illegal).

Not only did Stewart conduct a good interview, but I think the point he was trying to make was a good one. He was trying to say that these circumstances are no different than other wars and that the president's powers shouldn't change and neither should our values. Torturing criminals might save lives in certain circumstances (at least if you think torture gives you good information), but we do not condone that. So Yoo's logic about this being an unprecedented situation is false.

Although the interview was good, Jon Stewart did miss a few key points.

First, Stewart should have disagreed with Yoo in how much power an executive does and should have. Yoo thinks a president at war is only restrained from doing things that are not necessary for winning the war. Instead, I think it is our laws and our principles that are checks on presidential power.

In support of this point, Stewart could have pointed to history to show why this should b the case. Some president's have violated our basic principles in the name of war to enact policies that violated our laws and principles and were clearly mistakes. Internment of Americans of Japanese dissent is one such mistake. A government where the president's power is checked by our principles - as enacted in our laws - is necessary to prevent these types of overreaches. And I would argue that the Geneva Convention was just such a law that should have checked against Bush's overreach.

Second, we might understand a need to have policies that set different levels of interrogation than we have for American criminal suspects. However, to the extent that these are new situations and new powers. they should be created through law. Instead, John Yoo thought they could be determined by drafting a legal memo. Others, like Jack Goldsmith, rightly thought this needed to be done through Congressional legislation. Stewart should have pressed this point.

Finally, and maybe most importantly, Jon Stewart did not go after Yoo for the policies that were condoned and considered to be short of torture. Again, we can understand different rules and processes for terrorists, but to claim that what the Bush administration did (forced standing for days, extended sleep deprivation, food deprivation, physical violence, and water boarding) was short of torture is absurd. Yoo should have had to justify why water boarding is okay, but dunking someone's head in a bucket of water, submerging them in a pool, or holding a gun to their head is not torture.

But What Caused It?

A lot has been written about the financial crisis - what caused it, why was it so bad, and how do we get out. I hear that the best written explanation of the mechanics of the housing financial tools that played a part in the collapse is The Big Short by Michael Lewis (certainly Moneyball and Liar's Poker were well written). Too Big to Fail (think Game Change for the financial crisis) describes what everyone did and said as the crisis was unfolding, but is not as great at explaining the mechanics.

But for good detailed economic analysis of this recession, I have been relying mostly on Paul Krugman. His latest piece in the New York Review, co-authored with Robin Wells (the two are married) is probably the best analysis I have read about what really caused the financial crisis.

Krugman and Wells explore the four most common theories for the cause of the collapse.
- Low interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve
- Global savings glut
- Complicated financial products
- Government policy (ie Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac / CRA)

You might be surprised to hear that Krugman and wells say that the global savings glut is the primary cause of the real estate bubble and subsequent collapse. I just had an argument with one of the few conservatives I know about this, and I had come down decidedly on blaming Wall Street and complicated financial instruments. My conservative friend clearly blamed the government.

Krugman and Wells dismiss the low interest rate policy due to a real estate bubble that existed in Europe as well, where central banks were not keeping rates as low. They dismiss complicated financial products because all European real estate and American commercial real estate also had bubbles, and neither of those used these American products. And they dismiss government policy, which they have been dismissing for a long time, because Fannie and Freddie made less of the really troubled loans than other private institutions and there is no link between CRA-qualifying loans and high rates of default.

The global savings glut is explained as follows:

Historically, developing countries have run trade deficits with advanced countries as they buy machinery and other capital goods in order to raise their level of economic development. In the wake of the financial crisis that struck Asia in 1997–1998, this usual practice was turned on its head: developing economies in Asia and the Middle East ran large trade surpluses with advanced countries in order to accumulate large hoards of foreign assets as insurance against another financial crisis.

The authors say that this savings glut lead to low long-term interest rates (different from the short-term rates controlled by the Fed) and the low rates were primarily directed into real estate.

If I read the article right, the authors do blame financial institutions for letting a bubble take down the entire economy. Financial institutions were able to borrow much more than they could really back up through lax government rules and borrowing through repurchase agreements that were not government guaranteed, subjecting the firms to crises of confidence. Krugman and Wells say that loans like Repo agreements accounted for 60 percent of the banking system yet was largely unregulated.

If their analysis is correct, the next questions are how do we get out of the recession and how do we prevent this from happening again. Their next article in the NY Review will tell us how to get out. I need to learn more about the Wall Street reform to see if we are preventing this from happening again.

Behind the Scenes!

I don't know if you have noticed, but I am suddenly really into books that give behind-the-scenes accounts of current events. I loved The Nine and Game Change and Too Big to Fail is really good so far. And now, I am getting pretty excited about Bob Woodward Obama's Wars.

A year ago I would not have considered reading a Bob Woodward book. At the time, his books seemed gossipy and too "inside baseball". I wanted books about policy, not petty politics. But while I still like policy books, I am pushing a lot of other books aside to read these inside accounts.

I think the new interest in this sort of book has two sources. First, the books are usually pretty breezy, as non-fiction goes. This means that after an intense day at work, I can still manage to read and comprehend these books on my commute home.

But more importantly, I think seeing the inner-workings of other elected officials - or organizations that have a public impact - is fascinating now that I work for an elected official. I can compare what is happening in these books to what is happening at work. As I continue to get my bearings in a political institution, these books provide additional lessons. And I can't seem to get enough of it.

(By the way, I love that some of the coverage talks about the decision to work with Woodward or not. Some people have thought by bringing him in, they could control the story. But you can also see that shutting him out doesn't keep him from getting information. Washington is abuzz to see how Obama will be portrayed.)

I Like the Filibuster - Mostly

There is a lot of grumbling over the use of filibusters in the Senate this term from frustrated Democrats. While I hate the hyper-partisan atmosphere, I can't get myself too worked up over the filibuster. (New York Review of Books has a good - and one-sided - article on the filibuster which I found unconvincing.)

The Democrats had an extremely ambitious agenda after eight years of Bush and they were definitely seeking to move much or all of it through in two years. Here is a list of the major legislation they were seeking:

- Health care expansion
- Financial services reform
- Climate change
- Immigration reform

You'll note that I did not include tax reform or education - the former because I don't find it that significant since it seems to change with every administration and the later because Obama's reforms are not so liberal.

Since the four I listed are pretty significant changes, I am not upset that we were denied progress on two of these four even though I support all four. I think Democrats were a bit too ambitious and voters seem to be hitting the brakes. Without the filibuster, Democrats might have made even more progress and engendered even more of a negative reaction.

One possible counter argument that I can imagine is that if the Senate were not dominated by minority power, we wouldn't need to wait so long for any change. As it is now, when there is an opportunity for change, we are not satisfied with incremental change because we doubt we'll be able to get further increments in the future. So instead we go big, which creates serious minority party opposition.

While i think this is possible, I think it is more likely that without the check in the Senate, the party in power would seek major changes and appeal to their base. My fear in that case then is with whipsaw policies - going back and forth as the winds change. Imagine privatizing social security one year, then reversing it the next. Or enacting health care reforms only to see them repealed. While we have some of this now (taxes and benefits for the poor certainly wax and wane) I worry about this for bigger policies.

The one place I think the filibuster should be curtailed is on presidential appointments below the level of cabinet or Supreme Court. I think Republicans have stalled on Obama's appointments in a way that is shameful - although I am hearing that Obama also hasn't been very forceful or even attentive on this matter. These appointments have little impact when approved but major impact when they are all stalled. Filibuster ability is unnecessary in those cases.

Beyond that one reform though, I like the role of the Senate as more deliberate and slowing change. I think it works both ways, preventing ill-considered Republican and Democrat changes. I am confident that progress happens over time and that in time, 60 Senators do agree to move ahead.

In fact, I think that in a time with slightly less partisanship, we could have balanced immigration reform and incremental climate change action. If we see that time, we might forget all about the filibuster. The question is, when will we ever move beyond the insane hyper-partisanship.